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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE: LESSONS FROM IOWA
IAN BARTRUM
As was true across the country, the elections held in Iowa this past
November were tough on incumbents. In Iowa, however, it was not just
legislative and executive candidates that fell at the hands of an angry and
confused electorate-three members of the state supreme court also lost
their jobs after a controversial and closely contested judicial retention
election.' Iowa, like several other states, has adopted a version of the
Missouri Plan of merit-based judicial selection, in which the justices of the
supreme court appear periodically on the statewide ballot for a retention
vote. 2 This year, that vote was held in the shadow of the court's
controversial opinion in Varnum v. Brien, in which the justices
unanimously struck down the state's ban on same-sex marriage. 3 In
response, a coalition of socially conservative Iowans, under the loose
leadership of former high school principal Bob Vander Plaats, mounted a
vigorous campaign to oust those justices that happened to be up for
retention.4 With the aid of a tremendous influx of out-of-state money,
Vander Plaats's efforts succeeded in unseating Chief Justice Marsha
Ternus and Justices Michael Streit and David Baker. All three were
talented jurists and dedicated public servants, and their departure is a
profound loss to the state. With that said, I think it is important to consider
ways to restructure and improve a judicial retention process that badly
failed Iowans in 2010.
To begin, it is worth briefly recounting the story of the 2010 retention
campaign in Iowa. In 1998, the Iowa Legislature revised the state's
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1. Grant Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three Justices, DES MOINES REG., Nov. 3, 2010, at Al,
available at http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20101103/NEWS09/11030390/Iowans-dismiss-
three-justices [hereinafter Schulte, Iowans Dismiss].
2. IOWA CONST. art. V, § § 16-17.
3. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa 2009).
4. Dave Dreeszen, Vander Plaats Shakes Off Gubernatorial Losses, Leads Fight to Oust
Justices, SIoux CITY J., Feb. 1, 2010, at Al, available at http://siouxcityjoumal.com/news/local/all
article I a7a5957-f0d7-57 1d-b43b-511 7a5652f55.html.
5. Jason Hancock, Anti-gay Groups Spent $948,000 in Iowa to Oust Judges, IOWA INDEP., Nov.
18, 2010, http://iowaindependent.com/47598/anti-gay-groups-spent-948000-in-iowa-to-oust-judges;
Schulte, Iowans Dismiss, supra note 1.
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marriage statute to affirmatively exclude homosexual couples from the
institution. In April of 2009, the Iowa Supreme Court, speaking
unanimously through Justice Mark Cady, struck down the decade-old
statutory provision as a violation of the state's equal protection provision.7
The decision provoked an immediate backlash among social
conservatives, some of whom vowed to take out their anger on the justices
at the next retention election. As that election neared, the opportunistic
Vander Plaats-a three-time loser in state gubernatorial primaries-seized
the chance to promote himself as the public face of the anti-retention
movement. National conservative organizations likewise jumped at the
opportunity to influence an election that might serve as a warning to other46 ' 8"activist" judges across the country. The largest out-of-state contributions
came from New Jersey's National Organization for Marriage, which put
up more than $635,000 to fund a series of television commercials.9
Mississippi's American Family Organization spent another $140,000 as
the sole subsidizer of a group called Iowa for Freedom, and three other
groups combined to contribute a total of $170,000 to anti-retention
efforts.10 With nearly a million dollars in expenditures, the out-of-state
organizations overwhelmed the pro-retention efforts of bipartisan groups
like the Fair Courts for Us Committee;" the Iowa State Bar Association; 12
Justice, not Politics;13 and Iowans for Fair and Impartial Courts. 14
But the influence of out-of-state money was not the only cause for
concern coming out of the campaign. Within the state, several churches-
most notably Cornerstone World Outreach in Sioux City-openly pushed
their congregations to vote against retention. Notwithstanding the
church's tax-exempt 501(c)(3) status, which prohibits nonprofit
6. IOWA CODE § 595.2(1) (2011) ("Only a marriage between a male and female is valid.").
7. See Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 907.
8. See Dreeszen, supra note 4.
9. Hancock, supra note 5.
10. Id.
i1. Hancock, supra note 5.
12. Letter from Frank J. Carroll, President, Iowa State Bar Ass'n, to ISBA Member (Aug. 26,
2010), available at http://content.clearchannel.com/cc-common/mlib/I 165/08/1165_1283134196.pdf.
13. 0. Kay Henderson, Former Lieutenant Governors Launch "Justice, Not Politics," RADIO
IOWA (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.radioiowa.com/2010/09/27/former-lieutenant-govemors-launch-
justice-not-politics/.
14. Grant Schulte, Iowa Pastor: Churches Will Urge Voters to Remove 3 Justices, DES MOINES
REG., Oct. 11, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/2010l01/
NEWSO9/10110315/lIowa-pastor-Churches-will-urge-voters-to-remove-3-justices [hereinafter Schulte,
Iowa Pastor]. See generally IOWANS FOR FAIR AND IMPARTIAL COURTS, http://www.leaMiowacourts.
org/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2011).
15. Schulte, supra note 14.
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organizations from advocating for or against candidates for office,
Cornerstone pastor Cary Gordon openly defied the IRS and threatened to
challenge the tax code in federal court. Indeed, Gordon publicly pleaded
with God to "allow the IRS to attack my church, so I can take them all the
way to the U.S. Supreme Court."17 Again, out-of-state organizations such
as the Liberty Institute offered to provide free legal representation to help
Cornerstone make its case. But to date-despite repeated calls from
national groups-the IRS has not investigated the church's political
advocacy.' 9 This failure to enforce has been particularly frustrating for
other 501(c)(3) groups, such as the Iowa ACLU, who felt restrained from
taking a public position during the campaign.20 Meanwhile, the support of
Cornerstone and other churches helped Vander Plaats's anti-retention
coalition to vote out the three justices on the ballot. And-perhaps still
intoxicated with victory-the former principal likened the remaining
justices to "teenagers who flee from a beer party" and called on them to
"do the honorable thing [and] share the punishment of their peers" by
. . 21resigning.
So far, however, the Iowa Supreme Court seems unreceptive to Vander
Plaats's suggestion and, indeed, appears unbowed in the face of the
transparent efforts at political intimidation. On December 2, 2010, the
remaining justices voted on a new interim chief justice and selected Mark
Cady-the author of the Varnum opinion-for the position.22 Cady was
16. Michele Linck, Cornerstone Case Could Prove Costly, SIOUX CITY J., Oct. 3, 2010, at Al,
available at http://www.siouxcityjournal.com/news/local/al/article_aed770c-3d1d-585f-af4a-b6b64a
28b5ea.html.
17. Schulte, Iowa Pastor, supra note 14.
18. Hancock, supra note 5.
19. See Molly Montag, Group Asks IRS to Investigate Cornerstone Church, SIoux CITY J., Oct.
1, 2010, at Al, available at http://www.siouxcityjoumal.com/news/locallal/article_856385b5-elea-
5050-8027-0931ee9f5d39.html.
20. Ian Bartrum, Iowa Justices Shaken, but Not Bowed By Retention Vote Outcome, ACSBLOG
(Dec. 7, 2010, 6:03 PM), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/node/17848.
21. See Jennifer Jacobs, Vander Plaats Compares Iowa Justices to Teens Who Flee A Beer Party,
DES MOINES REG. IOWA POL. INSIDER BLOG (Dec. 23, 2010, 11:54 AM), http://blogs.desmoines
register.com/dmr/index.php/2010/12/23/vander-plaats-compares-iowa-justices-to-teens-who-flee-a-
beer-party. It is certainly worth noting that, at the time of this writing, Vander Plaats has also been
involved in a movement to impeach the remaining justices. Michael J. Crumb, Vander Plaats Raises
Funds to Remove 4 Justices, CONN. POST, Dec. 29, 2010, available at http://www.ctpost.com/news/
article/Vander-Plaats-raises-funds-to-remove-4-justices-926415.php; Rod Boshart, Vander Plaats
Might Back Impeaching Justices, QUAD CITY TIMES (Dec. 27, 2010), http://qctimes.com/news/locall
article 8d495796-Oefa-lleO-b7d9-001cc4c03286.html.
22. See Grant Schulte, Cady to Be Chief of Iowa Supreme Court Until New Justices Selected,
DES MOINES REG. CRIME & CTS. BLOG (Dec. 2, 2010, 1:38 PM), http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/
dmr/index.php/2010/12/02/cady-to-be-chief-of-iowa-supreme-court-until-new-justices-selected/.
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appointed to the court in 1998 by then governor Terry Branstad, who-in
an ironic twist-won his comeback bid for the state's highest office on the
night of the other justices' ouster.23 Branstad, for his part, has made
disturbing noises about his intentions when appointing replacement
justices, reportedly warning the state judicial nominating commission that
"[o]nly candidates who respect Iowa voters' rejection of last year's same-
sex marriage ruling should be considered . . . ."24 Still, remaining Justice
David Wiggins has publicly said that he believes the current selection
process adequately ensures judicial independence.25 Iowa ACLU Director
Ben Stone is not so sure, however, and has cautioned that "in a state that
doesn't have an independent judiciary, all of the rights that are at stake in
the state courts are up for grabs."26 On a moment's reflection, it does seem
that there is something problematic about a judicial selection and retention
process that allows a simple majority of voters to retaliate against judges
who are charged with protecting the constitutional rights of minority
groups.
To better understand the structural difficulties that Iowa's current
process presents, it may be helpful to think about the issue in light of
Bruce Ackerman's "dualist" account of American constitutionalism.27
While Ackerman's model describes the federal constitutional system-and
state constitutionalism may be different in important ways 28-the
fundamental structural commitments he reveals are still useful in this
context. Ackerman contrasts American constitutional "dualism" with two
European alternatives: British "monism" and German "rights
foundationalism."29 Prior to October of 2009, the British "monist" system
placed entire constitutional authority in Parliament, which could revisit
constitutional rights, if it chose, in keeping with election returns. 30
23. See id.
24. Jennifer Jacobs, Branstad: Political Imbalance on Judicial Nominating Commission Needs to
Be Corrected, DES MOINES REG. POL. INSIDER BLOG (Dec. 6, 2010, 4:01 PM), http://blogsdesmoines
register.com/dmrlindex.php/2010/12/06/branstad-political-imbalance-on-judicial-nominating-comfmission
-needs-to-be-corrected.
25. See Grant Schulte, Justice Wiggins: 'I Am Not Going to Second-Guess' Retention Results,
DES MOINES REG. CRIME & CTS. BLOG (Dec. 2, 2010, 9:41 PM), http://blogs.desmoinesregister.
com/dmr/index.php/2010/1 2/02/justice-wiggins-i-am-not-going-to-second-guess-retention-results.
26. Id.
27. Bruce Ackerman, We The People: Foundations 7 (1991).
28. See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Malleable Constitutions: Reflections on State
Constitutional Reform, 87 TEx. L. REv. 1517, 1517-20 (2009) (exploring the democratic payoffs of
more permissive amendment processes in state constitutions).
29. See ACKEPMAN, supra note 27, at 7-16.
30. Id. at 8. October 1, 2009, marked the opening of the United Kingdom's Supreme Court,
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Conversely, the German "rights foundationalist" model puts certain
individual rights entirely beyond legislative reach; the famous "human
dignity" provisions remain a stark reminder of destructive demagoguery
and the Holocaust.3 1 The American "dualist" model, Ackerman claims,
strikes a balance somewhere in between the European alternatives by
protecting certain individual rights as part of the "higher law," while
leaving most topics and issues to the whims of "normal politics."32 In this
two-track system, it is the court's role to preserve the "higher law"-the
Constitution-against encroachments by simple legislative majorities,
which are empowered only to engage in "normal" lawmaking. Only when
popular will has reached a sufficiently high threshold-when the
requirements for constitutional amendment are met-must the court yield
to the voice of "the People." Thus, in the "dualist" model, it becomes
critical to recognize the difference between the voice of "the People" and
that of a snapshot majority of citizens-and to zealously guard the former
against intrusions by the latter.
The question that the recent retention election in Iowa highlights is
whether a structure that allows a simple majority to intimidate or remove
the guardians of the "higher law" undermines our basic constitutional
structure. There are certainly those that would say no; the current model
simply helps guarantee that a constitutional court will stay within the
bounds of a majority consensus about constitutional meaning. But this
response, I think, only begs the question. After all, only "the People"-not
a passing majority consensus-have authority to speak in constitutional
terms. With this in mind, it might seem logical that a successful non-
retention vote should require some kind of supermajority, some provision
to ensure that our constitutional judges are not subject to the vagaries of
"normal politics" and tyrannical majorities. Requiring a supermajority to
unseat a sitting justice seems consistent with a "dualist" constitutional
structure in that it provides some mechanism to ensure that it is "the
People"-not just a reactionary majority (or even a committed minority)-
that believe the court has gotten the higher law egregiously wrong. In
Iowa, for example, amending the state constitution requires a heightened
demonstration of political will: a proposed amendment must win a
majority in two consecutive legislative sessions and must then go on the
which, for the first time, transferred ultimate judicial authority away from the House of Lords. History,
SUP. CT., http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/about/history.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2011). This seems
to bring Britain closer to the "dualist" constitutional model.
31. See ACKERMAN, supra note 27, at 15.
32. Id. at 6-7.
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ballot for a popular vote.33 Knowing they lacked the necessary support for
such an amendment, however, Vander Plaats and his supporters took
advantage of an easier route: remove (or at least intimidate) judges with a
simple majority non-retention vote.
Given how much sense a supermajority requirement seems to make, it
is perhaps surprising that more states have not made it a part of their
judicial retention structures. Of the thirteen states that have adopted a
straightforward version of the Missouri Plan, none require anything more
than a simple majority to oust a judge whose name appears on the ballot.34
Another six states that vary with regard to judicial appointment and
selection still hold periodic retention elections for at least some judicial
offices.35 Of these states, only two, Illinois and New Mexico, require any
kind of supermajority in their retention elections, and both of those states
actually require a supermajority to retain, rather than to remove, a judge.36
Thus, no state has adopted the structure I suggest here. This is most likely
because the architects of the Missouri Plan saw the retention election as a
"democratic" offset to a perhaps "elitist" selection process, in which the
general public has no input.37 In other words, the retention provisions were
implemented as a political compromise with those who supported outright
judicial elections of the kind that are held in over twenty states.38 But at
least implicit in the design of the Missouri Plan are judgments that the
judicial role is qualitatively different than the legislative role, and that we
value judges for their intellectual merit rather than their political charisma
or popularity. If that is true, it may be that the "democratic" counterweight
to the "elitist" selection process actually undermines the entire endeavor.
33. IOWA CONST. art. X, §1.
34. Those states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri,
Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wyoming. Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in
National Perspective, 74 Mo. L. REV. 751, 759 n.34 (2009); see also ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 38;
COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 25; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10; IND. CONST. art. VII, § 11; KAN. CONST. art. III,
§ 5; MO. CONST. art. V, § 25; OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B, § 2; WYO. CONST. art. 5, § 4(h); ALASKA
STAT. § 22.10.150 (2008); IOWA CODE § 46.24 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. § 24-817 (2004); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 16-1-2 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-115 (2009).
35. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16; ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12; MD. CONST. art. IV, § SA; N.M. CONST.
art. VI, § 33; PA. CONST. art. V, §§ 13, 15; UTAH CONST. art. VIII, §§ 8-9.
36. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(d); N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 33.
37. See Rachel Paine Caufield, Reconciling the Judicial Ideal and the Democratic Impulse in
Judicial Retention Elections, 74 Mo. L. REv. 573, 574-75 (2009).
38. See id. at 575 ("The plan was thought to be a compromise between judicial independence and
judicial accountability, balancing the two incompatible political goals in a workable (though
undeniably imperfect) compromise."). In truth, however, I find it hard to see how a supermajority
requirement could be seen as "elitist"; after all, it requires that more, not less, of the people agree with
a particular outcome.
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Having said all this, I recognize that making a change to supermajority
retention elections is probably a political impossibility at this point. In an
increasingly polarized climate in which the phrase judicial "activism" has
taken on highly politicized meanings, it is unlikely that there exists
sufficient public will to actually increase judicial independence. This is,
after all, the heart of the structural question at issue-the proper balance
point between judicial autonomy and judicial accountability-and it does
seem that the current movement is toward less autonomy. But, current
political realities notwithstanding, I think the Iowa experience should give
those who think carefully about constitutional design a moment's pause. It
may well be that the Missouri Plan envisioned retention elections as
vehicles to remove only those judges who engage in real misconduct, but
it has become clear that-whatever the intentions-these elections can
become a simple majority referendum on constitutional meaning. This, for
the reasons I have suggested, seems to present very real structural
problems, and I think they are problems worthy of increased scholarly
attention. I hope that the suggestion of supermajority retention elections
can provoke some thought along these lines.
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